Auctions, Matching and Market Design

  1. A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information, Econometrica, 47, 1979, 679‑88. Erratum.
  2. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 921‑43.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  3. The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (with Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1982, 105‑14.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  4. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (with Robert Weber), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1089‑1122.
    • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
  5. Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information (with Richard Engelbrecht‑Wiggans and Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11, 1983, 161‑69.
  6. The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, Social Goals and Social Organization: A Volume in Honor of Elisha Pazner, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Chapter 9, 261-89.
  7. Auction Theory, Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1-32.
  8. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, Summer 1989, 3-22.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory, edited by Manfredi La Manna, London: Dryden Press, 1997, 95-113.
  9. Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work, in Le Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes, 1996, Nobel Foundation, 1997, 382-392. (Also available on the Nobel Prize site.)  
  10. Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 771-778.
  11. Procuring Universal Telephone Service, in 1997 Industry Economics Conference, Industry Commission (ed.), Conference Proceedings, 10-11 July 1997, AGPS, Canberra.
  12. Combination Bidding in Spectrum Auctions, in Competition, Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Research, Sharon Gillett and Ingo Vogelsang (Eds), Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999, pp 19-26.
  13. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II (with Robert Weber), in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  14. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Journal of Political Economy, 108:2 (April, 2000), 245-272.
    • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  15. Package Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Revue Economique, vol. 3, no 3, May 2002, 391-402.
  16. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1), August 2002: Article 1. (Republished in BePress Advances in Theoretical Economics).
  17. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  18. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
  19. Ascending Proxy Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
  20. The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
    • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  21. Matching with Contracts (with John Hatfield), American Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913-935.
  22. Package Auctions and Package Exchanges (2004 Fisher-Schultz lecture), Econometrica, 75(4), July 2007, 935-966.
  23. Core-Selecting Package Auctions (with Bob Day), International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407. 
    • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  24. The Promise of Prediction Markets (22 co-authors), Science, 320, May 2008, 877-878.
  25. Substitute Goods, Auctions and Equilibrium with Bruno StruloviciJournal of Economic Theory, Vol 144, Issue 1, June 2008, pp 212-247.
  26. Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Sept 2010, vol 70, Issue 1: 62-70. 
  27. Assignment Messages and Exchanges, AEJ-Micro 1:2, August 2009, 95-113.
    • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  28. Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design, with Jon Levin. American Economic Review, Vol 100, Issue 2, May 2010, pp 603-607.
  29. Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” with Yuanchuan Lien and John Kagel, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Aug 2010, vol 2, number 3: 160-185. [Data files, Instructions, Online Appendix].
  30. Critical Issues in Market Design” Economic Inquiry, vol 48, number 2, April 2011: 311-320. Doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.
  31. Incentive Auction: Rules and Discussion, by Paul Milgrom, Lawrence Ausubel, Jonathan Levin and Ilya Segal. Published as Appendix C of the FCC 12-118 (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Incentive Auction, Released October 2, 2012).  
  32. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima. American Economic Review, vol 103, number 2, April 2013: 585-623. [published version]
  33. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions, with Bob Day, in the Handbook of Market Design, Zvika Neeman, Al Roth, and Nir Vulkan (eds), Oxford University Press, 2013.
  34. Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis, with John Kagel and Yuanchuan Lien, Games and Economic Behavior. vol 85, May 2014: 210-231.
  35. Adverse Selection and Auction Design in Internet Display Advertising, with Nick Arnosti and Marissa Beck. American Economic Review, October 2016.
  36. Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions, with Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin. In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  37. A Design Proposal for the US Spectrum Auction, with Ilya Segal. In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  38. Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Columbia University Press, 2017.
  39. Economics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation with Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ilya Segal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ,Vol 114, No. 28, July 2017: 7202-7209.