Incentives and Organization

  1. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.
    • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
  2. Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts), Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 1986, 18-32.
    • Reprinted in Economics of Evidence, Procedure and Litigation, edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2007.
  3. Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, August 1987, 453-476.
    • Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, edited by Michael Waldman, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
  4. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.
  5. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (with John Roberts), American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.
  6. Economic Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, August 1988, 444-58.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Reader, Peter Buckley and Jonathan Michie, eds., Oxford University Press, 1996.
  7. The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (with John Roberts), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.
  8. Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.
  9. Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 57-89.
    • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  10. Regulating Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.
    • Reprinted in The New Institutional Economics, edited by Erik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.
  11. A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy, edited by Peter Jackson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
  12. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.
    • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
    • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2003.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2008.
    • Reprinted in Institutional Law and Economics, edited by Pablo Spiller, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, forthcoming.
  13. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John Roberts), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.
  14. Pay, Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.
  15. The Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.
    • Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, edited by Nicolai Juul Foss, New York: Routledge, 2000.
    • Reprinted in Readings in the Economics of the Division of Labor, Vol 2: Modern Analyses, edited by Guang-Zhen Sun, World Scientific, 2005.
  16. The Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.
  17. Complementarity in Organizations,” with Erik Brynjolfsson (2012), in the Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, John Roberts and Bob Gibbons (eds), pp 11-55.