Mathematical Economics and Game Theory

  1. An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.
  2. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 1981, 380‑91.
  3. Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, New York: North Holland, 1981.
  4. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (with David Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.(+ Details)
    • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias L Khalil, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
  5. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.
  6. Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  7. Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  8. Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.
  9. Monotone Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180. (Errata)
  10. Comparing Equilibria (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.
    • Reprinted in Equilibrium, Donald Walker (ed), Edward Elgar Publishing, March 2000.
  11. Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?, Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), June 1994: 607-615.
  12. The LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.
    • Reprinted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists, John Cunningham Wood and Michael McLure (eds.), New York: Routledge, 2004.
  13. Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior 17, 1996: 113-128.
  14. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica 70(2), March 2002: 583-601.
  15. Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle, Chapter 18 in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University Press, 2006.
  16. Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games (with Joshua Mollner), forthcoming in Econometrica.